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YESTERDAY I WAS LYING:
CREEPING PRECLUSION OF RECIPROCAL
FEE AWARDS IN RESIDENTIAL
FORECLOSURE LITIGATION
ERIC A. ZACKS & DUSTIN A. ZACKS†
INTRODUCTION
“Yesterday, I was lying. Today I’m telling the truth.”
- Bob Arum, Boxing Promoter and Attorney1
As a result of the high volume of foreclosure litigation in the
wake of the Great Recession, scholars have explored several
outgrowths of the foreclosure crisis, developing a burgeoning body
of research. Scholars and commentators have authored studies
about a wide variety of foreclosure-related topics, ranging from the
disparate racial effects of the housing crisis2 to the many
legislative and court-instituted policies enacted to ameliorate the
harsh reality faced by financially distressed homeowners, all the
way through books examining the aftermath of the crisis and
lessons learned from the entire experience.3
†
Eric A. Zacks is an Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law
School. B.A., University of Michigan, 1998; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. Dustin
A. Zacks is a member of King, Nieves, & Zacks PLLC in West Palm Beach, Florida.
B.A., University of Michigan, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007.
1
Kevin Iole, Bob Arum Explains Infamous ‘Yesterday I Was Lying, Today I’m
Telling the Truth’ Line, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 29, 2016, 4:16 PM), https://sports.yahoo.
com/blogs/boxing/bob-arum-explains-infamous—yesterday-i-was-lying—today-i-mtelling-the-truth—line-201538810.html (“On the first night, Arum championed the
cause of one fighter. The next night, under the same circumstances with everyone
drinking heavily again, Arum reignited the argument. This time, though, instead of
arguing for the fighter he had the night before, he was arguing for the other fighter.
Bob Waters, a sports writer at Newsday in New York, called him on it. ‘Bob said, “Hey,
last night you said A was better and now you’re saying it’s B,” ’ Arum said. ‘And so I
smiled and I said, “Well, yesterday I was lying. Today I’m telling the truth.” ’ ”).
2
See André Douglas Pond Cummings, Families of Color in Crisis: Bearing the
Weight of the Financial Market Meltdown, 55 HOW. L.J. 303, 303 (2012).
3
See Dustin A. Zacks, The Grand Bargain: Pro-Borrower Responses to the
Housing Crisis and Implications for Future Lending and Homeownership, 57 LOY.
L. REV. 541, 557 (2011) [hereinafter Zacks, The Grand Bargain]. See generally
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN
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Our previous contributions to this evolving body of research
primarily focused on idiosyncratic and troubling doctrinal
developments in foreclosure litigation. This Article provides
another data point, consistent with our other findings—namely,
that in response to the record levels of foreclosure cases, judges
and legislatures largely chose symbolic palliative actions to give
an appearance of helping distressed homeowners, while at the
same time systematically narrowing borrower defenses.4 In
previous research, we offered support for these two points in
several different contexts:
• Legislative and judicial efforts at ameliorating externalities
of the foreclosure crisis;5
• Disciplinary actions or investigations regarding a host of
questionable or unethical foreclosure attorney conduct;6
• Judicial treatment of borrower defenses to fraudulent or
problematic assignments of mortgage or other title transfer
documentation commonly used in foreclosure litigation;7
• Application of statutes of limitation and the doctrine of res
judicata to lender claims in foreclosure cases;8 and

ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2019); LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH
FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO: HOW THE HARDEST HIT HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY (2019).
4
As one small emblematic example, at the same time the Florida Legislature was
forced to enact additional pleading and documentation requirements for banks to
ensure that bank attorneys would not continue to falsely assert that promissory notes
had been lost in thousands of cases, the legislature simultaneously enacted laws that
would allow banks and their attorneys to progress towards final judgments with less
hindrance. See H.R. 87, 23d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (creating an easier
pathway for banks to litigate using orders to show cause for final judgments of
foreclosure at the very outset of litigation, an alternative to the traditional rules of
pleading in civil procedure).
5
Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 542.
6
Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2013)
[hereinafter Zacks, Robo-Litigation]. As mentioned in Robo-Litigation, in one case the
chief judge of a county plagued with an enormous backlog of foreclosure cases quit his
post as judge to take a position at a high-volume foreclosure firm under investigation
by the state attorney general. Id. at 886.
7
See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, Not a Party: Challenging Mortgage
Assignments, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 175, 179–83 (2014); Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A.
Zacks, A Standing Question: Mortgages, Assignment, and Foreclosure, 40 J. CORP. L.
705, 718–26 (2015) [hereinafter Zacks & Zacks, A Standing Question].
8
See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, No Brakes: Loan Acceleration and
Diminishing Foreclosure Defenses, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 389,
390 (2018) [hereinafter Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes].
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• Borrower challenges to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. and its fundamental alteration of traditional
American recording practices.9
Our previous research articulated a new understanding of the
reasoning behind many of the attacks upon, or narrowing of,
borrower defenses and the lack of strict accountability for
questionable bank litigation practices. In sum, it appears that
state actors systemically frame the foreclosure context differently
from other types of civil litigation. The consequence of this
framing is that judges are emboldened to modify or dispense with
traditional civil practice procedures or doctrines, typically to the
detriment of financially distressed homeowners facing foreclosing
entities with significantly more resources.10
This Article extends this analysis and theory of systemic
framing to yet another area of longstanding jurisprudence facing
attack and overhaul in the context of distressed homeowner
litigation—namely, the applicability and availability of attorneys’
fees awards to the successful homeowner-litigant. Most, if not all,
mortgage contracts specifically allow for the foreclosing entity to
recover their attorneys’ fees in the event of default and
foreclosure.11 Many state statutes contain automatic reciprocity
provisions for such one-sided attorneys’ fees provisions regardless
of the type of contract.12 Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly in the wake
of our prior research, traditional application of such reciprocity
has begun to deteriorate and erode in the face of judicial
9

See Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing,
Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 552–53
(2011) [hereinafter Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine]; Dustin A. Zacks, Revenge
of the Clerks: MERS Confronts County Clerk and Qui Tam Lawsuits, 32 BANKING &
FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 17, 17–18 (2013).
10
Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 434 (“Thus, while we have
previously posited that judges preview the merits of individual foreclosure claims and
discount homeowner claims accordingly, we now suggest that the overall systemic
frame of court administration responses to the foreclosure crisis enforced and created
an atmosphere of almost ministerial enforcement or of a collection mechanism rather
than serving any truth-seeking function. Framing lawsuits primarily in terms of
efficiency rather than factfinding renders foreclosure a foregone conclusion, especially
when judges have an incentive to clear a large backlog of foreclosure cases such as
those pending after the 2008 financial crisis.”).
11
For an example of such language in a typical mortgage, see Florida
Single Family Mortgage Uniform Instrument Form 3010, FANNIE MAE ¶ 22,
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/3010w.doc (last visited Feb. 9, 2020)
(“If the default is not cured . . . [l]ender shall be entitled to collect all expenses
incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not
limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .”).
12
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(7) (West 2019).
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skepticism towards awarding homeowners’ attorneys’ fees.13
Accordingly, this Article continues the same narrative, in another
context, of state actors viewing and treating distressed
homeowners differently than other civil litigants, to the detriment
of those homeowners. Lenders are allowed to plead for recovery
under the mortgage, but in those rare instances when they lose for
standing or for title reasons, they may then seek to avoid paying
attorneys’ fees under the fee recovery statute because of that lack
of standing or title. In other words, courts permit lenders to “lie
yesterday” about being the proper party to enforce the contract
and believe that they are “telling the truth” today about not being
a party to the contract, which otherwise would require paying the
homeowners’ attorneys’ fees.
Part I begins with an explanation of the American Rule of
awarding attorneys’ fees and discusses the standard for fee
shifting statutes in the face of one-sided contract provisions. Part
II discusses and analyzes how judges and litigants have
successfully begun attacking traditional application of fee-shifting
statutes in the context of foreclosure litigation. Part III concludes
with the policy implications of narrowing the availability of
reciprocal fee awards.
I.
A.

AMERICAN RULE; FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES; STANDARDS

The American Rule and Its Implications

In civil litigation conducted within the United States, each
party is generally responsible for bearing its own litigation fees
and is generally prohibited from recovering attorneys’ fees from
the losing party.14 This principle is known as the American Rule.15
The rule is subject to criticism because it may not make the
prevailing party “whole” and compensate it sufficiently.16 This

13

See infra Part III.
See 10 FERN M. SMITH, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE CIVIL § 54.171(1)(a);
James R. Maxeiner, The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share, in COST AND
FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 288 (Mathias Reimann
ed., 2012) (IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE SER.
NO. 11).
15
James R. Maxeiner, supra note 14, at 288. The “English Rule,” which generally
permits the prevailing party to recover its fees and costs from the losing party, seems
to predominate among legal systems in the West. Id.
16
Id. at 288, 293 (“Through control of litigation, lawyers can force opposing
parties to devote resources to litigation; thanks to the no indemnity practice [of the
American Rule], those resources are forever lost.”).
14
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failure to adequately compensate prevailing parties can therefore
deter plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims.17 For example, a
potential suit for a few thousand dollars with no hope of recovering
attorneys’ fees may simply not be worth a litigant’s time or effort,
and an aggrieved party may find it impossible to find an attorney
to bring an otherwise valid claim.18
In such a situation, an attorney might only take such a small
matter on either (i) an hourly basis, which in the course of routine
civil litigation could easily dwarf the total amount of the judgment
sought, rendering pursuit of such judgment entirely wasteful; or
(ii) a contingency basis, which could involve such a large portion of
any potential recovery that a client determines litigation would
not be worth the effort. These two scenarios, of course, assume
that an attorney would actually consider taking such a small case
on either fee basis with no possibility of recovering attorneys’ fees.
Aside from deterring potential plaintiffs from bringing
otherwise valid claims, application of the American Rule may also
be criticized because it causes innocent defendants a loss. In other
words, a defendant may successfully and conclusively argue that
her conduct was not negligent, that she did not breach a contract,
or that a plaintiff’s case does not otherwise satisfy the elements of
a given claim. Yet, just as in the above case of a plaintiff deterred
from bringing an otherwise valid claim, this otherwise successful
defendant may not be made whole because she will not be
recompensed for her attorneys’ fees in defending the meritless or
unproven claim.19 In this way, the American Rule may also
insufficiently deter plaintiffs from bringing meritless or tenuous
claims to court.20 Just as in the case of a plaintiff who secures
victory on a valid claim only to see that judgment rendered a
nullity by her attorney’s bills, a successful defendant may feel that

17
See id. at 293 (“[The American Rule] destroys meritorious claims and promotes
baseless ones.”).
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
Id. at 294 (“The public takes greater notice, however, of baseless claims
that are enabled by no indemnity and lawyer control. This combination permits weak
parties with weak claims to extract settlements even from strong parties with
strong defenses.”).
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defeat of an opponent’s claim is entirely hollow, given that she
spent potentially thousands of dollars on the defense and suffered
the emotional effects of enduring protracted litigation.21
On the other hand, the American Rule may protect vulnerable
litigants without sufficient litigation resources from bearing the
risk of paying their opponent’s fees should they be defeated in
court.22 The indigent or low-income litigant, even if represented
on a contingency basis and with no capital outlay at the inception
of a case, might still refrain from bringing a suit against a
more sizable or powerful entity based on the possibility of an
adverse attorneys’ fees award. In this way, the American Rule
may be said to ameliorate the imbalance of power and resources
between parties.23
If attorneys’ fees awards for losing parties were a risk in
bringing claims or defenses, then this would induce powerful
parties to always hire the most expensive counsel possible and to
litigate solely for the purpose of increasing possible fee awards so
as to raise barriers to entry to litigation.24 Few, if any, indigent or
low-income clients would bother to bring any sort of small claim
against a powerful entity if they were to bear the risk of paying
their opponent to employ an army of expensive lawyers.
As a result of these issues raised by the American Rule, many
exceptions to the rule have developed at the federal and state level.
These exceptions can be mandatory in nature and require the
losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees or costs or may be
permissive in allowing a court discretion in awarding such fees.25
For example, the indigent or low-income client who may be
deterred from bringing an otherwise valid claim may find relief in
21

See, e.g., Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 543–44 (discussing the
toll foreclosure litigation may take on homeowners, including harm to financial,
physical, and emotional health).
22
See Terese A. West, Everybody Pays: Attorneys Fees and the American Rule,
MOSS & BARNETT (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.lawmoss.com/pp/publication-everybodypays-attorneys-fees-and-the-american-rule.pdf?77489.
23
See id. (“[T]he American rule presumes the existence of legitimate disputes and
ensures that neither party need fear an undue financial burden for turning to an
impartial forum for resolution.”).
24
See id. (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 231 (1872) (“When both client and
counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the other party there is danger of abuse.”)).
25
In regard to costs, for example, see FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(d) (“Costs in any action
dismissed under this rule shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that
action . . . .”). In regard to fees, see Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896,
897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]t is well established that Florida follows the
‘American Rule’; thus, attorney’s fees may only be awarded when authorized by
contract or statute.”).
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a statute designed to encourage attorneys to bring such lawsuits.
Such statutes might explicitly provide that attorneys’ fees
awards are available in suits alleging fair housing violations,
discrimination against a protected class, or whistleblower
actions.26 The clear goals and implications of such statutes
abrogating the American Rule are that public policy ought to
encourage bringing certain actions and that public interest
statutes would rarely be enforced or sought to be enforced if fees
awards were not possible.27 Similarly, other statutes or rules may
lessen the harsh application of the American Rule for litigants
defending against tenuous claims by allowing for attorneys’ fees
awards in the cases of frivolous actions or claims, or by allowing
sanctions that include discretionary attorneys’ fees awards in
cases of improper or dilatory conduct.28
Separate and apart from statutory regimes or rules of
procedure modifying the American Rule in a specific context, state
law generally treats the American Rule as a default rule that can
be changed by contract.29 Consequently, it is routine for parties to
enter into contracts that include provisions requiring the losing
party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the prevailing party.30
26

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How
Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice
(Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) 6–7 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 150, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407275.
27
See id. at 7.
28
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 2019):
“Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a
reasonable attorney’s fee, including prejudgment interest, to be paid to the
prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s
attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or
action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s
attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially
presented to the court or at any time before trial:
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the
claim or defense; or
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to
those material facts.”
29
See Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d at 897. Contracts typically are governed
by state law, and more specifically, by the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract
is made or enforced. Federal law may preempt the enforceability of fee-shifting
provisions to the extent that a particular legal area has been “federalized.” Smith,
supra note 14, § 54.171(1)(a). In addition, federal law also may specifically mandate,
or permit a federal court to rule, that the American Rule does not apply and
specifically provide for the prevailing party to be able to recover its attorneys’ fees.
See id. § 54.171(3)(a).
30
See SMITH, supra note 14, § 54.171(1)(a).
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The American Rule and its exceptions have played an
increasingly important part in mortgage foreclosure litigation
since the beginning of the Great Recession. Most, if not all, lenders
include fee-shifting provisions that require the borrower to pay the
costs and fees of the lender if the lender prevails in litigation
concerning the mortgage, such as a foreclosure action.31 These
provisions are obviously one-sided as written in that they only
require one party to pay if it loses but do not explicitly provide the
same benefit if that same party actually prevails. Such one-sided
provisions are particularly punitive in the context of consumer
form contracts or other agreements where contracts are offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.32
In the mortgage context, strict application of such unilateral
contractual provisions leads to a bevy of problematic implications.
A lender, for example, would be permitted to pursue tenuous
claims or engage in wasteful litigation practices designed to
increase defense costs, and the successfully defending borrower
would not be entitled to any relief from its fees expended in
defending against the claims. Lenders would likewise face no
consequences for filing questionable or insufficiently proven
claims, dismissing them, and then refiling such claims ad
infinitum until eventually winning a judgment. The costs to a
major financial institution or large servicer of bringing a lawsuit,
which include court filing fees and the fees paid to outside
counsel—often hired on the basis of ability to provide low-cost,
high-volume representation—have clearly not been effective
deterrents to stopping foreclosing entities from perpetrating
questionable tactics in litigation.33
For example, attorneys in judicial foreclosure states—where a
lender must bring a lawsuit as a plaintiff in order to foreclose a
homeowner and in which the lenders faced and paid attorneys’ fees
awards for case dismissals during the height of the housing
crisis—still did not effectively eliminate a host of problematic
practices in state courts.34 Even when faced with the risk of a fee
award to their opponents after a dismissal or a court-awarded

31

Indeed, the Fannie Mae uniform mortgage contains such a fee-shifting
provision. See Florida Single Family Mortgage Uniform Instrument Form 3010, supra
note 11, ¶ 22.
32
See Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 169, 176–77, 180–82
(2012) [hereinafter Zacks, Contracting Blame].
33
See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 884–88, 890, 901–03.
34
See id. at 891–92.
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sanction, lenders or their attorneys still submitted thousands of
improperly verified affidavits and assignments.35 Thus, when this
risk of extra expense or penalty for blameworthy conduct is
removed, foreclosing entities and their attorneys might be
even more cavalier about their adherence to ethical standards
in litigation.
Further, for distressed or financially at-risk homeowners, the
possibility of not recouping attorneys’ fees after defending
successive meritless or unproven suits may cause the further
deterioration of their household financial situation, decreasing the
likelihood of any possibility to save their homes through
reinstatement or settlement.36 Foreclosing entities would or could,
in this scenario, eventually prevail regardless of the underlying
merit of their claims, as they could simply exhaust the resources
of homeowners in continually defending lawsuits to a point where
hiring counsel becomes impossible.
This is not an idle threat. One of the benefits to homeowners
of a judicially supervised—and therefore elongated—foreclosure
process is the ability to bolster financial resources during the
process in order to reinstate or to appear more favorable for a
settlement, such as a modification of loan terms.37 This effect,
however, can be tempered in cases in which foreclosing entities
conduct their litigation more vigorously through, for example,
taking extensive discovery and depositions and through delaying
settlement negotiations.38 Each dollar borrowers spend on counsel
is an opportunity cost insofar as that dollar was not spent on trying
to reinstate their loans. Given that the borrowers’ legal fees may
not be recouped, lenders may be incentivized to litigate more
extensively, thus lowering the possibility of optimal settlement or
workout for distressed homeowners.

35

See id. at 902, 906, 907.
See Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 544 (noting the mere fact of a
filed foreclosure on one’s credit history, to give one example, can result in job
termination or other catastrophic financial harm).
37
See id. at 563.
38
See, e.g., id. at 564 n.117 (citing empirical research showing longer foreclosure
processes may simply result in higher indebtedness). In this way, elongating the
foreclosure process through pro-homeowner rulings could actually work to a
borrower’s detriment.
36
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In a practice area where, during the recent recession, some
counties reported that more than ninety percent of homeowners
facing foreclosure failed to retain counsel, this is a serious issue.39
Foreclosing entities already enjoy a large disparity in resources
and ability to conduct litigation. Removing the slight risk of
paying their opponents’ attorneys’ fees only encourages the
exploitation of this disparity of resources in such cases when
borrowers actually hire counsel. It also makes the borrower’s
choice of whether to devote dollars to defense lawyers or to a
possible reinstatement payment more stark. Therefore, as a result
of the harsh implications of the American Rule, states have
enacted statutes to dull the sharp edges that strict application of
such unilateral contractual fees clauses could bring.
B. Fee-Shifting State Statutes
Some state statutes permit, but do not require, a court to
award fees to the prevailing party if the contract would otherwise
have required that same party to pay its opponent’s fees if it had
lost.40 Such regimes are generally an attempt to restore the
mutuality of risk relative to success in the litigation and to restore
the balance that may not have existed when the contract was
executed and the one-sided clause was included.41 As suggested in
the prior section, such statutes appear well-suited to the
foreclosure context, where lenders normally insert one-sided
fee-shifting clauses and are more likely to institute claims based
upon the contracts, thus potentially leaving borrowers who
successfully defend foreclosures without a remedy for the
attorneys’ fees they necessarily incurred.

39

See Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures: A Crisis in Legal
Representation, BRENNAN CTR. for JUST. 14, 16 (2009), available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/foreclosures-crisis-legalrepresentation. Indeed, this logic is parallel to our arguments against eliminating any
functional statute of limitations in mortgage foreclosures.
40
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(7) (West 2019) (“If a contract contains a
provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any
action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to
the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or
defendant, with respect to the contract. This subsection applies to any contract
entered into on or after October 1, 1988.”).
41
See Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (“As this court has explained,
‘[s]ection 1717 [the fee-shifting statute] was enacted to establish mutuality of remedy
where [a] contractual provision makes recovery of attorney’s fees available for only
one party, and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s fee provisions.”).
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The borrower in the context of mortgage contract formation
and bargaining is likely in a substantially inferior position relative
to the lender in many respects. The borrower is likely unaware of
such one-sided attorneys’ fees provisions or, even if she is aware of
them, she is likely unable to negotiate away those provisions.42 If
borrowers are unaware of such provisions, they are unlikely to
seek alternatives, like lenders that do not require such a provision.
This means that there is no competition incentivizing lenders to
provide less one-sided provisions.43 Indeed, courts recognize this
basis for paternalistically imposing reciprocity upon unilateral
attorneys’ fees clauses:
[S]ome bad bargains pervade frequently occurring transactions
and have adverse consequences for society. Unilateral fee
provisions are usually seen in form contracts prepared by
commercial entities. Many of these forms govern consumer
transactions. The unilateral fee provision tucked away in the
legal text of a form contract effectually deprives many consumers
of access to the courts to redress contractual breaches. But
typically consumers lack sufficient bargaining power to coax
business entities into recasting such fee provisions. And
commercial parties need no leveling in negotiating contract
terms. Thus the purpose behind section 57.105(7) is obviously
that the Legislature found bilateral provisions necessary to
enable consumers to have representation and, thereby,
meaningful access to the machinery of justice in contractual
disputes affecting important consumer and family interests.44

Unilateral fee clauses also favor lenders in the sense that a
lender is much more likely to be the party pursuing claims based
on the nature of the lender-borrower relationship, such as those
relating to nonpayment of the underlying debt. This means that
the borrower more often will be defending claims as opposed to
seeking recovery under the contract. The provision accordingly
removes the risk of fee-shifting from the lender, the party most
likely to be pursuing meritless claims, while heightening the risk
of potential loss by the borrower, the party most likely
to be defending claims, in each instance even when the
borrower prevails. In this instance, even when the borrowers win,

42

See Zacks, Contracting Blame, supra note 32, at 176–77.
See id.
44
Mediplex Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (Farmer, C.J., dissenting).
43
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they still suffer a loss because they will not be compensated
for the attorneys’ fees they have paid while defending their
foreclosure cases.
Accordingly, statutes that mandate fee-shifting in the
foreclosure context, or otherwise permit a court to award fees to
the prevailing party, can provide substantial benefits to borrowers
that prevail in foreclosure proceedings. As indicated above, one of
the purposes of such provisions is to attempt to put the borrower
back into the same place in which the borrower otherwise would
have been had the lender not improperly or ineffectively
prosecuted its litigation.45 Within the context of the litigation, the
borrower is not actually coming out ahead in any sense, since the
borrower is only recovering the fees that she otherwise would have
to pay out of pocket.
Courts that award fees to attorneys may also determine
whether an enhanced fee recovery, such as a multiplier, is
appropriate to compensate the attorney adequately for having
taken on such a risky representation—that is, a contingency fee
arrangement.46 In the case of a foreclosure dismissal, no actual
dollar recovery is awarded to the homeowner-defendant. Thus, the
court has to determine what the value of the attorney’s
representation was in light of the hours worked, the risk involved
with such an arrangement, and the ability of the borrower to
obtain adequate compensation without the attorney’s ability to
seek a contingent recovery of fees.47 This is particularly important
with respect to indigent or insolvent borrowers, who may be able
to retain adequate counsel solely on a contingency basis or with
some sort of contingency fee arrangement. In some markets,
borrower-defendants pay their attorney or attorneys a flat fixed
monthly fee that does not equate to the amount that would have
been paid if the homeowner had retained the attorney on an hourly
basis.48 As such, borrowers’ attorneys often build in incentives for

45

See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
See Bank of N.Y. v. Williams, 979 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding no abuse of discretion in granting an award multiplying the attorney’s actual
fees by a factor of 2.5); Vivot v. Bank of Am., NA, 115 So. 3d 428, 429–30 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2013); J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp. v. Golden, 98 So. 3d 220, 224
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
47
See Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (Fla. 1985);
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 830–31 (Fla. 1990).
48
See, e.g., Polyana da Costa, Attorney Defends Taking on Mortgages as
Contingency Fee, DAILY BUS. REV. (Nov. 29, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
almID/1202475433460/.
46
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further compensation if in fact they are able to succeed in
defending their clients. As a result, many require their clients
to include contingency fee features that demand their clients
compensate them for the value of any recovery.49 The fee-shifting
statutory regime and the possibility of a multiplied fee award
accordingly allow courts to compensate borrower-defendants’
attorneys appropriately based on the contingent nature of
their representation.
Permitting borrowers to recover their fees thus may provide a
substantial benefit to attorneys that defend borrowers as well as
an incentive for attorneys to engage in such representation in the
first place. Furthermore, recovery of fees may allow homeowners
in many cases to remain in their homes without making regular
payments while the foreclosure litigation is being fought.
Contrarily, if one views attorneys defending foreclosures as, in the
words of one high-volume foreclosure firm attorney, “hordes of
lawyers defending on the specious ground that their clients are not
sure who to pay,”50 then allowing for fee awards only encourages
such superficial or hypertechnical defense work.51
Extrapolating this counterargument further, if attorneys’ fees
awards make representation and dilatory defense tactics more
likely, then one may say it is not only the individual litigants
or opponents of such conduct who are harmed by the creation
of additional incentives to represent homeowners. Foreclosing
entities might also argue that needlessly increasing costs of

49

See id.
American Legal and Financial Network’s Amended Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Respondent at 13, Glass v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (No. SC17-1387).
51
We briefly note that we do not refer to the amicus brief’s signator as working
for a “high-volume foreclosure firm[]” without cause. See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra
note 6, at 875. The attorney signing and submitting the amicus brief to the Florida
Supreme Court is apparently employed by Choice Legal Group. See Brief in Support
of Respondent, supra note 50, at 21. Choice Legal Group is a firm formerly known as
the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson; the firm changed its name because the firm’s
namesake pleaded guilty to bar offenses in conducting foreclosure litigation and was
temporarily suspended from practicing law. See Kim Miller, Foreclosure Mill Head
Faces Florida Bar Discipline, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 7, 2013), https://web.archive.
org/web/20130123012852/http://blogs.palmbeachpost.com/realtime/2013/01/07/foreclo
sure-mill-head-faces-florida-bar-discipline/. Among other accusations, the Watson
firm reportedly assigned attorneys to impossible caseload numbers. See Zacks, RoboLitigation, supra note 6, at 886 & n.167 (noting that an attorney for Watson testified
to handling between five and six thousand cases at any one time). Watson’s firm
eventually paid $2 million to settle the Florida Attorney General’s investigation into
their foreclosure litigation practices. Id. at 886 & n.171.
50
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litigation creates externalities for society as a whole in
jurisdictions where reciprocal fee awards are allowed, including
making future lending less likely or reducing the size of future
loan offers in such jurisdictions.52 Similarly, these tactics are
commonly blamed for tying up court dockets and delaying
resolution of innumerable valid claims by months or years
by grinding the resolution of civil dockets to a halt.53 Thus,
although homeowners might argue that imposing reciprocity
into unilateral fee provisions is the only way to ensure that
litigants are made whole when facing unequal bargaining power
combined with endless or sloppy litigation, foreclosing entities
may correspondingly argue that such imposition results in damage
to the judicial and financial systems and is wasteful in light of the
overwhelming validity of most foreclosure claims.
C. Fee-Shifting Requirements
Fee-shifting statutes and case law interpreting them typically
require the prevailing party that did not otherwise have the
benefit of the contractual fee-shifting provision to demonstrate
that it succeeded in some respect on the merits of the suit.54 This
standard varies in practice from state to state, but generally can
be satisfied by receiving some or all of the benefit sought in
instituting the suit, such as some sort of damage recovery.55
Whether the defendant is the prevailing party is a more
difficult question than might otherwise appear. Obviously, if the
plaintiff does not win a final judgment, then it seems that the
defendant should be deemed to be the prevailing party with
respect to receiving the benefit of fee-shifting. If one does not win
at litigation, then one has inherently lost at litigation. This is
actually the situation, however, only when the defendant has
succeeded in preventing the plaintiff from receiving any sort of

52

See Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage
Credit 1 (Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper No. 2003-16, 2001),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=410768.
53
See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 50, at 13–14 (referring to Florida
courts as “bursting” with the aforementioned “hordes of [borrower defense] lawyers”).
54
See, e.g., Blue Infiniti, LLC v. Wilson, 170 So. 3d 136, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (discussing prevailing party status in the context of voluntary dismissals).
55
Under federal law, the prevailing party standard is typically based on whether
the relief “ ‘materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying
the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.’ ” Lefemine v.
Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 4 (2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)).
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relief.56 Similarly, a dismissal without prejudice may not indicate
that a plaintiff definitively has not or will not recover some of
the relief demanded, since the plaintiff may refile the same
claim later.57
In the foreclosure context, it may be difficult for a defendant
to achieve prevailing party status. Lenders, when confronted
with defenses based on procedural deficiencies such as those
related to service of process or notice of breach, may choose to
voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice and refile
after fixing any procedural problems.58 As noted above, forcing
the foreclosing entity into a voluntary dismissal, or even
winning a preliminary motion to dismiss, may not be sufficient
to qualify the borrower-defendant as a prevailing party for
fee-shifting purposes.59
II. ANOTHER BARRIER FOR DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE CASES
A.

A Successful Defense as Justification for Avoiding
Fee-Shifting

This Article focuses on another area where courts have
begun to limit the defenses and remedies available to
borrower-defendants and their attorneys. Lenders have creatively
attempted to circumvent the application of such statutory
fee-shifting regimes by using the borrower-defendants’ successful
trial court arguments against them. As mentioned above,
borrower-defendants may employ an array of defenses to defeat
the foreclosure claim instituted by the lender. These defenses can
include any number of lender deficiencies, such as the failure to
comply with service of process requirements, failure to provide
notice of breach in accordance with the requirements of the note
56
See Blue Infiniti, LLC, 170 So. 3d at 139 (discussing cases in which payment of
a majority of a plaintiff’s demanded amount resulted in a voluntary dismissal but not
a reciprocal fee award).
57
See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Regan, Note, Plaintiffs’ Absolute Right to Voluntary
Dismissal: Legitimate Right or Abuse of Judicial Process?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 118, 130
(1984). Under federal law, this would be analyzed based on whether the legal
relationship had been changed between the parties, and since the dismissal without
prejudice does not change the legal relationship between the parties, the defendant
would not be deemed the prevailing party. See Lefemine, 568 U.S. at 4 (citing Farrar,
506 U.S. at 111–12).
58
See Regan, supra note 57, at 120.
59
See, e.g., Kelly v. BankUnited, FSB, 159 So. 3d 403, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (granting dismissal by virtue of a short sale not sufficient to merit prevailing
party status).
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or mortgage, or standing or real party in interest-based defenses.60
During the rise of mortgage securitization, many lenders failed to
document transfers in interest with assignments of mortgage or
otherwise lost or destroyed key loan documents, which made it
more difficult to demonstrate the rights to enforce the notes and
mortgages that were the basis for the foreclosure claims.61 In some
cases, the pressure to pursue foreclosure claims as fast as possible
in the face of such documentation issues resulted in fraudulent
practices such as backdating assignments, forging signatures,
improper notarization, and other problematic practices.62 Despite
documentation of these practices, few lenders or lender attorneys
have received punishment for such actions.63
Borrowers’ attorneys have relied upon these documentation
problems and problematic assignment practices to construct
defenses attacking the foreclosing entity’s standing or right to
enforce the loan documents.64 Under these defense theories, if
the foreclosing entity cannot properly document or is relying
upon inaccurate or fraudulent documentation to support its
enforcement of the note and mortgage, then the entity should not
be granted final judgment and the right to foreclose.65 As indicated
above, there appears to have been widespread fraud as well as
negligent documentation practices in the assignment of mortgages
and the prosecuting of foreclosure claims in the wake of the Great
Recession.66 Presumably, such defenses have been employed in
thousands of cases.67 These defenses are fairly intuitive and often
conclusive, although courts have liberally permitted foreclosures
in such instances despite the applicability of such defenses.68
60
See Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 501,
515, 520–23, 525 (2013).
61
See id. at 514–21, 550.
62
See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 869–70.
63
See id. at 890–94.
64
See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 50, at 13 (reporting “hordes” of
lawyers denying that the foreclosing plaintiff has standing).
65
See John B. Leach, Taking a Stand on Standing: The Real Party in Interest
Conflict in Ohio Foreclosure Actions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 1099, 1099–100 (2012).
66
See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
67
See Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of
the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 19, 33–34 (2011).
68
See, e.g., Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine, supra note 9, at 609 (noting
that courts largely accepted whichever of the numerous theories for standing
attorneys created by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.); cf. Zacks &
Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 410 (noting that courts disregard the reason for
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Even where these defenses have been successful, lenders have
begun to seek to avoid paying the borrower’s attorneys’ fees by
using prevailing defense theories, such as standing, against the
borrower’s attorney.69 While admitting that the statutory regime
requiring a lender to pay the fees would generally apply if a
borrower were successful, lenders argue that this regime only
applies if the lender is in fact bound by the mortgage contract with
the fee-shifting provision.70 Where borrowers have been successful
in demonstrating that lenders do not have standing or the right to
enforce the note and mortgage, lenders argue that, accordingly,
they should not be bound by the fee-shifting provisions in contracts
that otherwise would permit the court, under the fee-shifting
statute, to require lenders to pay borrowers’ fees.71 An analogous
argument suggests that when a borrower has successfully argued
that a contract is void or unenforceable, then the same reasoning
should follow. Homeowners argue that these contentions, if
accepted, create a “heads you win, tails I lose” scenario in which
their successful defenses against meritless claims create the basis
upon which to deny them recovery of their attorneys’ fees spent in
proving the baselessness of the claims brought.
B. Formalism to Protect Foreclosing Entities
A lender that seeks to avoid fee-shifting by using a borrower’s
successful standing or title defense against the borrower is often
successful where the court is receptive to a formalistic argument.72
Employed literally, a borrower that successfully demonstrated
dismissals of foreclosure suits—whether due to outright fraud or mere technical
deficiencies—when considering whether or not to apply statutes of limitation or res
judicata against foreclosing banks).
69
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Elkind, 254 So. 3d 1153, 1153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2018) (finding the bank unsuccessfully appealed an award of fees after voluntary
dismissal, contending that a borrower who successfully asserts a standing defense
cannot obtain reciprocity of fees under contract when a bank is held not a party to
that contract).
70
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB, 270 So. 3d 367, 368,
369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (finding the bank unsuccessfully asserted same
argument as was used in Elkind, whereafter the court ruled that a voluntary
dismissal means the borrower’s standing argument has not been reached).
71
See, e.g., Harris v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 2D17-2555, 2018 WL 6816177, at
*3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018) (“[W]e recognize that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Districts each have held that when a party prevails by establishing that the plaintiff
completely failed to prove standing, there is no longer a contract between the parties
and no basis upon which to enforce a fee provision.”).
72
See, e.g., Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (“[W]e must return to the precise text of the agreement.”).
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that the foreclosing entity lacked standing—for example, because
it could not demonstrate the right to enforce the mortgage
contract—would be unable to recover attorneys’ fees because it was
successful in showing that the foreclosing entity was not a party
to the contract.73
Since the foreclosing entity is not a
party to the contract, it is not bound by the fee-shifting provision,
which means that the borrower would not be entitled to rely
upon the fee-shifting provision—or the statutory regime
permitting attorneys’ fees recovery if there was a one-sided
fee-shifting provision.74 Again, this logic would hold for the
homeowner-defendant successful in alleging the contract was void,
and it appears that such reasoning is now the majority rule
in Florida.75
For example, in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass, the circuit
court dismissed Nationstar’s case with prejudice based on the
argument from Glass, the borrower, that Nationstar, the lender,
lacked standing to enforce the note and mortgage.76 Nationstar
appealed and Glass filed a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees and
costs. On appeal, Glass argued that the court correctly dismissed
the lender’s complaint for lack of standing, but also argued that
she was entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees based upon the
73
See, e.g., Harris, 2018 WL 6816177, at *3 (discussing Florida decisions in accord
with this proposition).
74
Cf. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 So. 2d at 1251–52 (“[I]n order to be responsible for
fees, one first had to be responsible for the bill. But the unappealed result of trial was
that under the agreement Mrs. McCoy had not assumed a responsibility for payment
of the hospital bill. It follows that she also did not incur an obligation to pay attorney’s
fees. Without an obligation to pay fees, there is no basis to invoke the compelled
mutuality provision of section 57.105(2).”). In other mortgage foreclosure cases,
lenders had sought to argue that an earlier dismissal—even with prejudice—did not
mean that the defendant had prevailed with respect to standing issues to the extent
that the lender had instituted new litigation that would address the same issues.
Courts were less receptive to these arguments. See Bank of N.Y. v. Williams, 979 So.
2d 347, 347–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“The refiling of the same suit after the
voluntary dismissal does not alter the [defendants]’ right to recover prevailing party
attorney’s fees incurred in defense of the first suit.”). Presumably, if these cases were
relitigated now, the foreclosing entities would make the formalistic arguments we
discuss herein and likely prevail.
75
See, e.g., Harris, 2018 WL 6816177, at *4. Note, however, that Nationstar
Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), was accepted for review
by the Florida Supreme Court, and a substantive opinion was issued; after some
membership changes on the court, a new opinion was issued reversing its prior
decision to hear the matter and the original opinion was vacated. Nevertheless,
the state of affairs as of the date of this writing demonstrates an immense
progression in the acceptance of such arguments that preclude fee awards for
homeowners’ attorneys.
76
219 So. 3d at 898.
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application of reciprocity contemplated in § 57.105(7) into the
unilateral fee clause in the mortgage.77 Florida’s Fourth District
Court of Appeals denied Glass’s motion for appellate attorneys’
fees, holding that “[a] party that prevails on its argument that
dismissal is required because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue
upon the contract cannot recover fees based upon a provision in
that same contract.”78
Other Florida cases follow similar reasoning. In Bank of New
York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Fitzgerald, the court denied
attorneys’ fees to Fitzgerald, a borrower who had successfully
prevailed on her standing argument.79 Fitzgerald had prevailed
because the note produced was specially endorsed to JPMorgan
Chase—not the foreclosing party—and because no other evidence
of negotiation or transfer, such as an assignment of mortgage, was
produced.80 Because the defendant demonstrated that Bank of
New York Mellon was not a party to the contract and therefore not
entitled to enforce it, the defendant could not invoke reciprocity of
the attorneys’ fees provision.81 Even in cases where borrowers
have obtained a dismissal based in part on their assertions that
signatures on loan documents may have been forgeries, borrowers
have been unable to recover attorneys’ fees because a forged
document renders the document a “nullity,” meaning that there
was no contract upon which to base a recovery of attorneys’ fees.82
Notwithstanding the lender’s reliance on a fraudulent document,
the court questioned how it could award attorneys’ fees under a
contract that never existed.83

77

See id. at 899.
Id.
79
215 So. 3d 116, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
80
See id. at 118.
81
See id. at 121.
82
See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Mestre, 159 So. 3d 953, 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015). This line of reasoning has been adopted from other contexts. See, e.g., HFC
Collection Ctr., Inc. v. Alexander, 190 So. 3d 1114, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(finding that the borrower was estopped from relying on the contract to obtain an
attorneys’ fees award in the credit card borrowing context because Alexander had
succeeded in proving there was no contract between the parties); Fla. Med. Ctr. Inc.,
v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248, 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because the
defendant had prevailed on her theory that she was not liable under a contract with
respect to paying her husband’s hospital bill, she also could not invoke the mutuality
provision of the fee-shifting statute).
83
See Mestre, 159 So. 3d at 957.
78
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Borrowers have also been denied relief in cases where the
action was dismissed before the issue of standing was litigated.84
In one instance, a court created a new burden of proof, requiring a
borrower to demonstrate that it was a proper party to the contract.
Indeed, that defendant sought to demonstrate that she never
signed the mortgage contract and that any purported mortgage
documents contained fraudulent borrower signatures.85 Although
the defendant had not prevailed on those issues because the
foreclosing entity chose instead to voluntarily dismiss her case, the
court reasoned that she could not demonstrate that she was a
proper party to the contract permitted to enforce the fee-shifting
statute and related provision in the mortgage contract.86 The
formalism of these approaches also can be seen in how such
decisions distinguish earlier cases, such as Nudel v. Flagstar
Bank, FSB.
In Nudel, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to the borrower
after it dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice based
on a standing argument.87 In that case, the circuit court dismissed
Flagstar’s foreclosure action without prejudice based on Nudel’s
argument that Flagstar lacked standing because Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the named mortgagee under
the applicable mortgage, did not assign the mortgage to Flagstar
until after the inception of the lawsuit.88 Nudel then “moved for
attorney’s fees and costs . . . relying in part on the attorney’s fee
provision in the mortgage.”89 The circuit court denied Nudel’s
motion for attorneys’ fees, and she appealed.90
On appeal, Flagstar argued that Nudel was estopped from
seeking attorneys’ fees under the mortgage after successfully
arguing that Flagstar lacked standing to foreclose under the

84
See Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1116
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the borrower-defendant had the burden of
proving that she was a party to the contract, which she failed to do).
85
See id. at 1114.
86
See id. at 1115–16. The court did note in its dicta that its decision should not
be construed as to state that a party can never recover prevailing party fees when the
defense is that they were not a party to the contract. See id. at 1116. A party could
obtain sanctions, or if they are unsuccessful in their defense that they are not a
party to the contract and ultimately prevail, then § 57.105(7)’s reciprocity may apply.
See id.
87
60 So. 3d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
88
See id.
89
Id.
90
See id.
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mortgage.91 The court rejected this argument, holding that
Nudel was entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees.92 Importantly,
in rejecting Flagstar’s estoppel argument, the court explained
that “Flagstar and Nudel were described as the ‘lender’ and
‘borrower’ respectively in the mortgage and” therefore, “they
[were] bound by it.”93 Courts denying attorneys’ fees to successful
borrower-defendants have distinguished the Nudel case because
Flagstar was named as the original party to the contract as the
original lender. In other instances, by contrast, the foreclosing
entity has not been the original lender and could not rely on
this distinction.94
C. Normative Distinctions
The above approaches do have some intuitive sense to them.
If the borrower wants to argue that the foreclosing entity is not a
party to the contract and is successful with respect to that defense,
then the borrower seemingly should not be entitled to take
advantage of any benefits in the contract that otherwise would
have been binding had the foreclosing entity been a party. This
argument is fairly straightforward and attractive when applied to
procedure and estoppel.95 However, many arguments support the
opposite conclusion.
If the foreclosing entity had prevailed after initiating
foreclosure proceedings, then it would have been entitled to the
benefits of the fees provision and to collect its fees from the
91

See id. at 1165.
See id.
93
Id.
94
See Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017).
95
This line of reasoning is more compelling in the absence of a fee-shifting statute
designed to provide mutuality of risk and remedy. Brown v. M St. Five, LLC, 56 A.3d
765, 780 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e are troubled by M Street Five’s attempt to enforce a
discrete provision of a contract that M Street Five itself argued was void ab initio; by
doing so, M Street Five is essentially attempting to ‘have its cake and eat it too.’ ”).
Although not a mortgage foreclosure case, Brown outlines the basic estoppel
arguments relative to a defendant who successfully argues that a contract is void and
then attempts to invoke the protection of a fee-shifting provision in a contract—and,
notably, not the application of a fee-shifting statute. Judicial estoppel may be
appropriate to prevent a party from changing positions if that party has already
“taken a position before a court of law, whether in a pleading, in a deposition, or in
testimony . . . .” Id. The “ ‘broader doctrine of “equitable estoppel” ’ ” prevents a party
that knowingly accepts the benefits of a particular legal position or outcome from
“ ‘ “subsequently tak[ing] an inconsistent position to avoid the corresponding
obligations or effects.” ’ ” Id. at 780–81 (citation omitted).
92
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borrower. If anything, the foreclosing entity should be estopped
from arguing that it is not a party to the contract—and should be
deemed to have stipulated to this fact—for purposes of the
fee-shifting regime. Once the foreclosing entity has initiated the
foreclosing proceeding, it is in fact arguing that it is a party to the
contract or entitled to all of the benefits and also ought to be bound
by all of the obligations of the contract.96 The formalist approach
described above creates the exact “heads I win, tails you lose”
situation referenced above, wherein the defendant borrower will
be stuck with the fee-shifting provision if the foreclosing entity
wins, but unable to recover her fees—and thus, still lose—under
the fee-shifting regime designed to create mutuality under
such provisions, even if she in fact prevails on a title or
standing defense.97
Indeed, even in Florida, which is the focus of this Article and
other studies showing judicially created, singular exceptions to
longstanding rules to the benefit of foreclosing entities, courts
previously seemed to recognize the inherent inequity and inanity
of allowing a party to argue such contradictory positions. In
Nudel, for example, the court noted that “Flagstar may not seek
affirmative relief under the mortgage and then take the position
that provisions of the mortgage do not apply to it.”98 This logic was
the same as in earlier litigation calling for specific performance of
a condition of a contract:
[The losing plaintiff] contended before the trial court that as a
result of the contract being cancelled prior to its assignment, the
provision for attorney’s fees ceased to exist. We hold that the

96
One may note here that in no small part due to a number of ghastly ethical
headlines made by banks and their attorneys in the conducting of foreclosure
litigation, the Florida Supreme Court was forced to create an additional rule requiring
verifications in foreclosure complaints. See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at
871; In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 So. 3d 555, 556 (Fla.
2010) (per curiam). The major thrust behind requiring bank or servicer employees to
verify what their lawyers plead in court is “to provide incentive for the plaintiff to
appropriately investigate and verify its ownership of the note or right to enforce the
note and ensure that the allegations in the complaint are accurate . . . .” Id.
97
See Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (“The [fee-shifting] statute
would fall short of this goal of full mutuality of remedy if its benefits were denied to
parties who defeat contract claims by proving that they were not parties to the alleged
contract or that it was never formed.”).
98
Nudel, 60 So. 3d at 1165.
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plaintiff is estopped to maintain such a position in an action in
which he has sought specific performance of a contract providing
for attorney’s fees.99

In other jurisdictions, courts have concluded that “it is
extraordinarily inequitable to deny a party who successfully
defends an action on a contract, which claims attorney’s fees, the
right to recover its attorney’s fees and costs simply because the
party initiating the case has filed a frivolous lawsuit.”100
California courts, for example, have looked to the underlying
purpose and policies of the fee-shifting statutory regime as well as
equitable principles, which are not as reconcilable with the more
formalist approach described above.101 Since the purpose of such
fee-shifting statutes is to ensure that each party bears an equal
risk relative to paying the other party’s attorneys’ fees, California
courts have concluded that a successful defense to a contract
action, including a defense based on the “inapplicability,
invalidity, unenforceability, or nonexistence” of the subject
contract, justifies an award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant.102

99

Ross v. Hacker, 284 So. 2d 399, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
Jones v. Drain, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Jones involved the
enforceability of the compelled mutuality fee-shifting statute with respect to a real
estate purchase contract. It is, however, worth noting that in California, the statutory
language lends itself to a more liberal interpretation of who is entitled to take
advantage of the compelled fee-shifting provision because it recognizes that a party
may be sued on a contract even though it is not actually a party. Part 1717 of the
California Civil Code allows for fees to be awarded to the prevailing party “whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not . . . .” Hsu, 891 P.2d at 809
(tracing the development of Part 1717 and the subsequent amendments by the
California legislature to clarify that, among other issues, final judgments were not
necessary for an award of fees and that success on non-contractual claims was
irrelevant to fee awards under the statute).
101
See, e.g., Jones, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (“The courts have consistently held that
the award of Civil Code section 1717 contractual attorney’s fees is to be governed by
equitable principles.”); Hsu, 891 P.2d at 813 (“[I]n determining litigation success,
courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided
by ‘equitable considerations.’ ”).
102
N. Assoc. v. Bell, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (deciding whether
a landlord could recover attorneys’ fees under a contract in a suit to terminate a
month-to-month lease where the original written contract containing a fee-shifting
provision had expired); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83, 85 (Cal. 1979)
(finding that the fee-shifting statute’s “purposes require section 1717 be interpreted
to further provide a reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory defendant, sued on a
contract as if he were a party to it, when a plaintiff would clearly be entitled to
attorney’s fees should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against
the defendant”).
100
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The estoppel argument outlined above by a formalist
approach also ignores the context of these cases. In these
instances, the foreclosing entity is the party that instituted
litigation and sought legal remedy against the borrowing entity.
The estoppel argument might be more compelling if the borrower
were actually the instigator of the litigation. For example, if the
borrower sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that the
purported holder of the mortgage was not a valid lienholder
because the mortgage-holder lacked title to the mortgage, then
the estoppel argument in that context would make more sense.
Since the borrower was affirmatively trying to avoid the contract,
it should not be entitled to the benefits of the contract that
otherwise would apply—that is, the fee-shifting provision and
fee-shifting regime.103
If one assumes that the fee-shifting statute concerns parties
to the contract rather than the lawsuit, then such a formalistic
approach is also consistent with interpretation principles that
suggest construing a statute strictly where the statute overrules
common law, as in the foreclosure context where the permissive
fee-shifting regimes overrule the American Rule otherwise
applicable under state law.104 This formalistic approach, however,
ignores both the purpose of the fee-shifting regimes and the
consequential effect of requiring a defendant to prove that the
plaintiff was a party to the contract.
Fee-shifting regimes, as discussed above, are designed to
ensure that parties with inferior bargaining power will have
access to adequate counsel even where such parties cannot obtain
or sufficiently compensate counsel through traditional fee
agreements. In the negotiation or drafting context, the party may
have been unable to require mutuality with respect to establishing
an exception to the American Rule. In the dispute context, the
inability to recover fees from the opposing party empowers the
103
See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. Tokyo Electron, Ltd., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 484
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“If section 1717 did not apply in this situation [where a party
prevailed in asserting that it was not bound by a contract that contained a fee-shifting
provision], the right to attorney fees would be effectively unilateral—regardless
of the reciprocal wording of the attorney fee provision allowing attorney fees to
the prevailing attorney—because only the party seeking to affirm and enforce
the agreement could invoke its attorney fee provision.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
104
See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg. LLC, v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896, 898 (“[B]ecause the
statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed.”); Fla.
Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016).
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more powerful party to be aggressive with respect to instituting
claims and also protects the more powerful party, as the less
powerful party may find it difficult to find counsel willing to
institute or defend claims in the absence of such potential fee
recovery. By interpreting the fee-shifting regimes in such a
way, courts reinforce the disparity in power between contracting
parties. Further, the strict interpretation creates a strange
disincentive for a party to seek a certain type of victory or to
only assert certain types of defenses in litigation, but not others.
It certainly seems problematic for courts to effectively encourage
attorneys to focus their defense efforts on some technical or
procedural defenses but not defenses based on standing.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A.

Encouraging Cavalier Litigation and Repeat Offenders, and
Discouraging Homeowner Representation

Borrower-defendants may find it difficult to prevail with
traditional legal arguments that otherwise would have provided a
successful defense and corresponding prevailing party status.105
Some courts have recently begun to ignore or rewrite the
longstanding precedent that loan acceleration starts the statute of
limitations clock or that acceleration consolidates the loan into an
indivisible obligation for res judicata purposes.106 Instead, courts
have permitted exceptions specifically for foreclosing entities;
lenders may accelerate loans repeatedly and potentially refile
deficient lawsuits ad infinitum with respect to the same
underlying debt.107 Notably, these decisions largely ignore the
reasons for prior dismissals and the implications of prior lender
conduct in requiring such dismissals.108 By ignoring lenders’ prior
acts, then, courts have signaled that banks may attempt to
foreclose based on flimsy, nonexistent, or even fraudulent evidence
and that will not preclude successful refiling of their claims.
Similarly, in disallowing borrower discovery on assignment
of mortgage issues and that in denying defenses based
upon assignment problems implicated in chain of title or
standing defenses, courts have likewise telegraphed that banks
and foreclosing entities do not have to fear the implications of
105
106
107
108

See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
See Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 394–95.
See id.
See id. at 409.
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filing thousands of forged or fraudulent documents.109
If
these documents and discovery surrounding their production
and submittal to courts and county clerks are routinely
ruled irrelevant, then banks have no impetus to ensure that
such documents are produced and recorded with accuracy upon
proper verification.
Much in the same way, denying attorneys’ fees for dismissals
in foreclosure cases subtly indicates judicial disinterest in
incentivizing banks and foreclosing entities to ensure their cases
are supported with proper evidence. If a given bank or foreclosing
entity faces the decision of whether to proceed to file a case on
questionable evidence rather than waiting to properly investigate
and ensure the veracity of such evidence, then courts’ refusals to
award fees in such instances are a clear gesture that banks need
not worry about such a decision—little to no risk exists of bearing
their adversaries’ attorneys’ fees.110 Of course, while this pattern
of disincentivizing proper vetting of claims seems consistent
throughout much of the judicial treatment examined in our prior
works, an opposing view might hold that other court strictures are
sufficient to prevent the filing of outright false claims and that
attorneys’ fees awards do not therefore serve as any additional
deterrent to cavalier behavior during litigation.111
In this contrary view, the inherent power of the court to
sanction litigants, or rules of procedure that specifically allow
motions for sanctions for asserting baseless claims in the manner
modeled after Federal Rule 11(b), is or ought to be enough for
litigants to refrain from bringing questionable evidence or claims
to court.112 Unfortunately, as our previous research has suggested,
this has not been the case.113 The responses of state bar
associations, legislatures, and judges have been notably tepid in
the face of a litany of attorney misconduct in foreclosure actions.114
As such, the removal of one of the few checks and balances on bank
109

See Zacks & Zacks, A Standing Question, supra note 7, at 731–35.
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that foreclosing entities bear a heavy burden
of lost money each and every month when foreclosure litigation is elongated or
delayed. Zacks, The Grand Bargain, supra note 3, at 571–72. The perpetual rush to
get cases to judgment from both foreclosing entities and their attorneys is a primary
contributor to the ethical lapses documented in our previous work. Zacks,
Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 904–05.
111
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 2019). For full text, see supra
note 28.
112
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c).
113
See supra Introduction.
114
See Zacks, Robo-Litigation, supra note 6, at 890–94.
110
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conduct—the award of attorneys’ fees to one’s opponent when one’s
claim is dismissed—will surely decrease what little incentive
banks currently have to verify their claims before bringing them
to court.
Further, removal of the possibility of fee awards also
potentially
deters
adequate
representation
of
such
borrower-defendants, as alluded to above. Potential homeowners’
attorneys will undoubtedly be aware that winning a case on the
basis of one certain argument but not on the basis of another may
result in a court refusing to award fees. As such, it is entirely
possible that attorneys will focus more on issues where a
possibility of fee awards lie, to the detriment of a strategy of
focusing on the client’s best defenses whatever the subject area.
This could have the deleterious effect of discouraging such
attorneys from agreeing to represent indigent borrowers in such
risky cases, even where there otherwise would be valid defenses.
Or attorneys may simply be forced to charge distressed
homeowners more, which would no doubt preclude representation
for many indebted households. In a practice area in which most
homeowners may not be represented against foreclosing entities
with endless wells of resources, further discouraging attorney
representation will surely lead to more negative outcomes for
such homeowners.115
B. The “Systemic Frame” Here, as Elsewhere, Denigrates Basic
Fairness to Civil Litigants
Our previous research has remarked upon the seeming
preference for courts to attempt to shorten foreclosure litigation
timelines and to institute proceedings, rules, and litigation
pathways that are separate and distinct from other routine
consumer civil litigation.116 In this manner, courts and court
administrators have purposefully placed foreclosures into large
dockets, for example, in an effort to clear case backlogs.117
Similarly, many jurisdictions utilized retired, unelected judges for
the express purpose of disposing of foreclosure cases.118
Yet part and parcel of this process has been the diminishment
of borrowers’ counsel and their arguments. Our previous work has
described this kind of classification of foreclosure cases into
115
116
117
118

See Clark & Barron, supra note 39, at 2.
See supra Introduction.
See Zacks & Zacks, No Brakes, supra note 8, at 432–34.
See id. at 433.
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separate structures and processes, including employing retired
judges to preside over packed dockets, as a “systemic fram[ing]” of
all foreclosure litigation as a needlessly wasteful practice based
upon dilatory defense tactics and baseless defenses.119
In this view, the creeping refusal to award attorneys’ fees to
successful homeowners is yet another outgrowth of this systemic
framing of foreclosure litigation. If one accepts the view through
the systemic frame that accelerating the timetable of foreclosure
litigation is a valid policy goal and that borrower defenses are
needless ploys to delay the inevitable “right” substantive result, it
follows that foreclosing entities should routinely win cases without
answering questions regarding their assignments of mortgage.
Statutes of limitation similarly should be amended or interpreted
very liberally so as to allow foreclosing entities to refile cases as
many times as necessary to eventually win. The creation of new
exceptions and rules to effectuate a refusal to award fees in the
rare case of a foreclosure dismissal, then, is simply another data
point suggesting the movement towards an unrestrained and
effectively nonjudicial foreclosure process with increasingly
impossible litigation burdens for homeowners.
Put another way, refusing to award attorneys’ fees may
simply be another demonstration of state actors’ singular view of
foreclosure litigation as something distinct from a traditional and
neutral fact-finding civil litigation expedition. First, the systemic
frame implicates and ratifies the idea that if “[t]he [borrower]
didn’t pay the mortgage, we’re done here.”120 Individual cases and
therefore individual or novel defenses are not in focus through this
frame—the defendant enters the courtroom with a presumption of
default and unjustified delay.
The frame also places dismissals or the reasons for such
dismissals in a position of little or no importance—indeed, rather
uniquely in civil litigation, statutes of limitation and res judicata
may not apply if one of the parties happens to be a foreclosing bank
or servicer.121 Whether a case was dismissed for missing a
deadline by a day or whether a case was dismissed because of
fraud is simply not in focus through the frame—because dismissal
of a foreclosure claim, for whatever reason, is just a minor
119

See id. at 432, 434. One would not expect, for example, judges in other civil
litigation involving significant property transfers to remark that “[i]f you can’t do [the
foreclosure trial] within an hour, you’re not a trial attorney.” Id. at 429 n.271.
120
Id. at 433.
121
See id. at 390.
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roadblock delaying an inevitable judgment against a homeowner
assumed to be in default. Finally, in discouraging such dismissals
and in dulling the effect of and reasons for such dismissals, it
seems to follow that when such dismissals actually occur, they
ought not to be rewarded or encouraged through attorneys’ fees
awards. If one examined each of these noted developments in
foreclosure litigation in isolation, then perhaps support for the
existence of systemic framing might rightfully be challenged.
Taken in toto, however, this Article argues that the effects
of systemic framing are present throughout all stages of
litigation—including after a dismissal when a homeowner is
seeking recoupment of her attorneys’ fees.
C. Incentivizing Superficiality and Guesswork
The final implications of the development of creeping
preclusion of reciprocal fee awards for homeowners are the
creation of incentives for litigants to focus on technicalities and the
necessity for judges to undertake artificial guesswork when
considering whether to award fees. With regard to defenses, some
courts now require borrowers to prevail on standing to obtain a
dismissal, while later requiring borrowers to demonstrate that the
bank had standing, in order to get a fee award.122 Attorneys,
therefore, may simply choose to focus their clients’ limited
litigation resources on more technical aspects of defense work if
they are aware that winning a dismissal based upon standing
defenses may not provide as impactful a victory as a dismissal
based upon a technical defense. In a practice area rampant with
a host of past ethical failures, one would hope courts would
encourage serious examination of whether a foreclosing plaintiff
is being truthful. Yet in failing to award fees for successful
fact-finding expeditions regarding standing, courts will be
presented with fewer of these substantive arguments. As such,
courts are less likely to expose those cases where a party is
actually attempting to foreclose without a wholly truthful case. If
anything, those parties facing dismissal based upon a more
technical defense ought to be given the softer landing of not paying
their opponent’s fees—and not those facing dismissal for creating
false evidence on standing or failing to meet the minimal burden
of showing entitlement to enforce and collect on a loan.
122
Fla. Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 197 So. 3d 1112, 1116 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
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Further, the artificial creation of a subject-area exception to
reciprocal fee awards in the context of successful standing in
mortgage foreclosure-defense litigation can only breed more
artificiality and guesswork. Courts that are more sympathetic to
homeowners have already been forced to create illogical
distinctions in order to award reciprocal fees in such cases. One
Florida appellate district, in Madl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., for
example, created a strange distinction in awarding fees: when a
foreclosing entity does not show evidence of standing at the
inception of a case but later produces some evidence of standing at
trial, such as an undated allonge to the note filed after the
inception of the case, fees may be reciprocally awarded to the
successful homeowner if the case is dismissed.123 This of course
creates the strange requirement for homeowners to prevail at trial
in preventing the foreclosing entity from meeting its burden of
proof regarding standing, but to later prove—for purposes of a fee
award—that some amount of evidence was produced that
evidences their opponent’s standing. Must a court, under this line
of reasoning, specify what percentage of a borrower’s defense was
devoted to standing, and if so, what percentage of its burden of
proof the bank met or what percentage of its standing allegations
were proven?
But guesswork and other imprecise approaches to reach a
certain result are not restricted to those more pro-homeowner
districts. Indeed, because Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Glass has
been accepted, ruled upon, and then vacated by the Florida
Supreme Court,124 the procedural posture makes it difficult to
123
244 So. 3d 1134, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); cf. Harris v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, No. 2D17-2555, 2018 WL 6816177, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).
124
See generally Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Glass, 219 So. 3d 896 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017). We note that our concerns over judicial guesswork were partially
concurred with in the Florida Supreme Court’s eventual opinion in Glass. Glass v.
Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. SC17-1387, 2019 Fla. LEXIS 30, at *8–9 (Fla. Jan. 4,
2019). Although the decision was eventually receded from after appointment of new
judges to the court, the original decision notes, as we do, that part of its disagreement
with the Fourth District’s decision stems from a disagreement on the reason for the
original trial court dismissal. This is exactly the kind of ex post guesswork that we
warn against in this Section. See id. at *7–8 (discussing the affirmative defenses
raised by the borrowers and noting that the trial court did not explicitly state the
grounds for dismissal and that the Fourth District incorrectly stated that standing
was the only grounds for dismissal). Yet whether one ultimately agrees or disagrees
with the outcome of the Glass decisions, they support the idea that an entire appellate
court sitting en banc can directly contravene or omit arguments that litigants have
propounded in order to guess or estimate what portion of a dismissal is based upon
standing arguments in order to reach a result under the creeping fee preclusion

2019]

YESTERDAY I WAS LYING

1177

follow the court’s logic in reaching its decision refusing to
award attorneys’ fees. The court in Glass emphatically notes the
distinction between cases not awarding fees because a foreclosing
entity was not a party to the contract and cases such as Nudel.125
In Nudel, the court noted, the foreclosing entity was named as the
original lender.126 In this way, the court seemed to intimate that
this had some independent significance to show Flagstar was a
party to the Nudel contract subject to its fees provision. But this
decision was made after Flagstar had its claim dismissed for lack
of standing. If a litigant has its case dismissed because it cannot
prove standing or entitlement to enforce an instrument, then what
difference could it make if the written agreement states the
litigant is, in fact, a party to the contract? In either event, when
forced to assert a prima facie case or to meet its burden at trial,
the litigant failed to prove standing, rendering such distinctions
meaningless: a litigant whose case has been dismissed has proven
nothing. Both the anti-homeowner and pro-homeowner sides of
the reciprocal fee award court division are increasingly required to
stretch all logic to reach their decisions, and we therefore suggest
that the newly created anti-reciprocal fee award jurisprudence is
regrettable in this respect as well.
In this way, failing to uniformly award reciprocal fee awards
forces litigants to channel their inner Bob Arum, the famed boxing
promoter, when seeking fee awards: they must effectively argue
that “Yesterday I was lying” (when I argued the bank lacked
standing), “but today I am telling the truth” (as today I argue for
the bank’s standing and fees obligation under the contract).
Foreclosing entities are similarly pushed into making nonsensical
arguments: to avoid reciprocal fee awards, banks in Florida must
argue and verify under penalty of perjury that they have standing
to enforce the mortgage contract in their written pleadings, but
then effectively proclaim after dismissal, “Yesterday I was lying.”

jurisprudence we have described. The Florida Supreme Court, at least until its opinion
was receded from, noted that the Fourth District, at least in Glass, guessed wrong.
See id. at *7–9. (The Fourth District “both misstates the basis of the trial court’s ruling
on Glass’s motion for dismissal and fails to address Glass’s Motion for appellate
attorney’s fees based on the voluntary dismissal. . . . [T]he Fourth District stated, ‘On
appeal, [Glass] argued that the court correctly dismissed the Lender’s complaint for
lack of standing.’ This is not an accurate statement of Glass’s argument.”).
125
Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 219 So. 3d at 898.
126
Nudel v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 60 So. 3d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).

